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Abstract
This paper presents the first quantum entanglement establishment
scheme for strangers who neither pre-share any secret nor have any au-
thenticated classical channel between them. The proposed protocol re-
quires only the help of two almost dishonest third parties (TPs) to achieve
the goal. The security analyses indicate that the proposed protocol is se-
cure against not only an external eavesdropper’s attack, but also the TP’s
attack.
PACS: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Keywords: Quantum Cryptography, Almost Dishonest Third Party,
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1 Introduction
Quantum entanglement, one of the most attractive physical phenomena, has
been widely researched in recent years. Quantum entanglement provides a
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"spooky relation at a distance," which allows two or more participants who
share entangled quantum states to have correlated information. Based on the
concept of quantum entanglement, various quantum cryptographic protocols are
possible. For example, quantum key distribution allows two remote participants
to share a secure key [1]; quantum teleportation "sends" quanta to a remote
location without any physical photon transmission [2]; quantum dense-coding
communication allows one to transmit two-bit information via a one-bit quan-
tum transmission; and quantum blind computation [3] allows a user to perform
quantum computations with the help of a quantum server, without revealing the
intended computations. In addition, quantum secret sharing [4], quantum state
sharing [5], quantum remote state preparation [6], quantum signature [7], quan-
tum private comparison [8, 9], etc., are all possible because of shared quantum
entanglement states. Research has shown that if shared quantum entanglements
are in incorrect states or are interrupted by malicious users during the entangle-
ment establishment process, then incorrect results may occur, and the protocol
is considered to be insecure [1, 10–16]. Accordingly, assurance of security and
correctness during the establishment of entanglement becomes an imperative
issue in quantum cryptography.
The problem with the establishment of entanglement has been most often
treated in two ways. The first is to simply assume that the entanglement is pre-
shared by the participants [2]. The second–which is also our focus here–describes
the entanglement establishment procedure in detail [1]. For this approach, one
often assumes the existence of an authentication classical channel between
two users, which can be used to discuss the correctness of the shared entan-
gled states. For example, if Alice wants to share an entanglement with Bob,
Alice will generate a series of entangled quantum states, which include multiple
quantum particles, and transmit the entangled particles to Bob. Then Alice
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and Bob choose some entangled states for public discussion: they respectively
measure the selected entangled states and compare the measurement result via
the authenticated classical channel. If the comparison result is accepted, then
Alice and Bob believe that the entanglement is well established.
However, to share an authenticated classical channel, the implication is that
Alice and Bob should know each other beforehand. What if Alice and Bob are
strangers–i.e., they did not meet each other beforehand? In that case, Alice
and Bob might have to look for another client–say, Charlie–as a third party
(TP) [17–19], who respectively shares a quantum channel and an authenticated
classical channel with them and eventually can help them share an entangle-
ment. The trustworthiness of this TP has been an interesting topic in quantum
cryptography. The issue surrounds the usefulness of the constructed protocol in
practice. The ideal case assumes the existence of a completely trusted TP who
always executes the protocol loyally and never reveals the important information
of the users. This case is conceptually the same as assuming the existence of an
authenticated classical channel between two involved users. In these cases, the
TP is assumed to be a semi-honest agent who will loyally execute the protocol,
but may try to steal Alice and Bob’s secret using passive attacks. The semi-
honest TP will passively collect the classical information exchanged between
Alice and Bob and try to reveal their secrets from this information [8, 9].
In the other more practical cases, the TP is assumed to be almost dishon-
est and may deviate from the normal procedure of the protocol to reveal the
participants’ secret information except acting in collusion with the clients. That
is, the TP not only can passively collect useful information but also can actively
perform any attack on the protocol except conspiring with the participant. In
this case, however, Alice and Bob, who are strangers and thus do not directly
share an authenticated channel, may not be able to detect and avoid the TP’s
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attack, and their secret information might thus be leaked to the TP [10]. In this
regard, can we also develop a secure protocol for a pair of strangers to share
entanglement under the help of almost dishonest TPs? This is the question
addressed by this work.
In order to do that, we assume the existence of two non-communicating TPs.
That is, Alice and Bob attempt to find two TPs from the group of clients who
simultaneously share both the quantum channels and authenticated classical
channels with them. Because the chosen TPs are non-communicating, they
do not know who will be the counter party–e.g., the other TP–of the current
scenario. This also increases the difficulty of collusion between both TPs. That
is, the TPs are non-communicating and do not know each other, and hence it
is more difficult for them to act in collusion.
If we let the first almost dishonest TP generate entangled quantum states for
Alice and Bob, and the second almost dishonest TP helps Alice and Bob check
the correctness of the shared entanglement. Moreover, let each TP watch the
other TP’s malicious behavior; then the entanglement could thus be established
between Alice and Bob securely and correctly.
It should be noted here that the power of the conventional TP is now divided
into two parts, which is similar to the idea of secret sharing, in which a top secret
is divided into several shadows and only when a sufficient amount t of shadows
is collected can the top secret be derived. Fewer than t shadows will never
reveal the top secret. In our case, owing to this power separation of TPs and
due to the assumption of non-colluding TPs, the trustworthiness of TPs in our
protocol can be demoted from semi-honest to almost dishonest.
Now, because the TPs are non-communicating and almost dishonest, other
clients in the protocol can serve well as TPs as long as they simultaneously
share both quantum channels and authenticated classical channels with both
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clients who want to establish entanglement in the protocol. In other words,
within our protocol, the only involved roles are the clients themselves. Among
them, some connect with quantum or authenticated classical channels whereas
others are strangers who do not have any direct connection. Whoever wants to
establish entanglement with the other, has to identify two other clients serving as
their TPs, who can directly communicate with both users in both the quantum
channel and the authenticated classical channel. (see also Fig. 1)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the pro-
posed environment and the quantum entanglement establishment protocol be-
tween strangers; a quantum communication protocol is also presented as an
example. Section 3 provides the security analyses of the proposed protocol.
Finally, the conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2 Proposed Protocol
This section introduces the proposed protocol. First, the environment with two
TPs is introduced in Section 2.1; then, the proposed quantum entanglement
establishment protocol is presented in Section 2.2. Finally, as an example, a
quantum secure direct communication protocol based on the proposed entan-
glement establishment is described in Section 2.3.
2.1 Environment
This section describes the proposed environment and its security requirement.
The environment, including two participants, Alice and Bob, and two TPs,
TP1 and TP2, is described as follows. (see also Fig. 1, in which the dotted
lines denote the quantum channels and the solid lines denote the authenticated
classical channels.)
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Alice Bob
TP1
TP2
Figure 1: The Proposed Environment
1. Alice (Bob) shares authenticated classical channels and quantum channels
with two TPs, respectively. Note that Alice and Bob do not have any
authenticated channel directly connected to each other.
2. The transmitted information on the authenticated classical channel is pub-
lic, but the receiver can verify its integrity and originality.
3. TPs are almost dishonest in the sense that they can perform any possible
attacks except conspiring with Alice, Bob, or the other TP.
4. In our proposed environment, if a TP cannot successfully attack the shared
entanglement, then the TP will not announce the fake results during the
public discussion.
5. Each TP is designed to prevent the other TP from attacks; hence, both
TPs can be almost dishonest.
6. An external attacker, Eve, may try to perform any attack to disturb, forge,
or eavesdrop on the state of Alice and Bob’s shared entanglement.
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2.2 Proposed Quantum Entanglement Establishment
This section comprises a quantum entanglement establishment protocol for the
proposed environment. The proposed protocol allows the sender, Alice to share
an entangled state with the stranger Bob. In the proposed protocol, though the
quantum signals are generated by TP1, Alice and Bob can determine whether
TP1 performs any attack on the quantum signals with the help of TP2. The
proposed protocol proceeds as follows (see Fig. 2):
Discussion 
(Decoy Photon)
Alice                         TP1                               TP2                            Bob
1 2 : Φ
+
D : 0 , 1 , + , −{ }
1 D 2 D
Discussion 
(Decoy Photon)
Select
pos,basis pos,basis
1 2
pos,basis
measure 
the pos.
measurement result (      )mr mrCompare
1 2
remaining qubits: 
securely shared entanglement
Figure 2: The Proposed Entanglement Establishment.
(Step1) TP1 generates a sequence of EPR entangled states, |Φ+〉
12
= 1√
2
(|00〉
+ |11〉)
12
, where the subscripts 1 and 2 denote respectively the first and
the second qubits. Let Q1 (Q2) denotes the particle sequence includes
all the first (second) qubit of each EPR state in order. TP1 then inserts
enough amount of decoy photons [20–22] randomly chosen from the four
states: {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) , |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)
}
into Q1 (Q2)
to form a new sequence S1 (S2.) TP1 sends the sequence S1 to Alice, and
S2 to Bob, respectively.
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(Step2) Once Alice receives the quantum sequence S1 from TP1, she sends
an acknowledgement to TP1 via the authenticated classical channel. TP1
and Alice then will publicly discuss the decoy photons for the eavesdrop-
ping detection. TP1 informs the position and the basis of each decoy
photon to Alice. Alice measures these decoy photons, and then sends
the measurement results to TP1. By comparing the initial states and the
measurement results, TP1 can detect the existence of eavesdroppers. Sim-
ilarly, Bob will also publicly discuss the decoy photons in S2 with TP1.
According to the quantum cryptographic protocol which will be executed
after entanglement establishment, if Alice will send the received particles
out later, Alice has to use the photon number splitter (PNS) and the wave-
length filter to check if Trojan Horse attacks exist in the protocol [23–26].
(The detailed analyses of the Trojan Horse attacks will be given in Section
3.2)
(Step3) If the quantum transmissions are free from the eavesdroppers and the
Trojan Horse attacks, Alice and Bob can remove the decoy photons and
recover the sequences Q1 and Q2. They then will discuss the entanglement
of the shared EPR states via the help of TP2. TP2 randomly selects the
position and basis (X basis or Z basis) for each photon to be checked and
announces the positions and bases to Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob then
measure the selected particles in Q1 (Q2) with the bases chosen by TP2,
and sends the measurement results to TP2. Because
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)
= 1√
2
(|++〉+ |−−〉) ,
(1)
TP2 can compare the measurement results from Alice to Bob to determine
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Alice                            Bob             ...            Zark
TP1
TP2
Figure 3: The Multiparty Environment
if Alice and Bob’s qubits are in |Φ+〉.
(Step4) If the entanglement correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s qubits are
correct, Alice (Bob) will remove the measured qubits selected by TP2
from Q1 (Q2,) and have a new sequence, Q
′
1 (Q
′
2.) The entanglement
establishment between Alice and Bob is completed.
It should be noted that the proposed entanglement establishment scheme can
also be extended to a multi-participant scenario. Suppose that the participants–
Alice, Bob, Charlie, ..., and Zack, who are strangers to one another–want to
share an entanglement. They can look for two almost dishonest TPs who share
quantum channels and authenticated classical channels with all participants (see
Fig. 3). TP1 can generate the entanglement and securely distribute the particles
to them, which are the same as Step 1 and Step 2; then, similar to Step 3, TP2
selects the measurement bases and positions for each participant and compares
the measurement results returned from every participant. Hence, TP2 can help
the participants check the correctness of the entanglement they shared. Finally,
the participants can share an entanglement.
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Figure 4: The Quantum Direct Secure Communication based on the Proposed
Entanglement Establishment.
2.3 Quantum Secure Direct Communication
Section 2.2 describes the processes of the proposed quantum entanglement es-
tablishment protocol. In this section, we show how a quantum secure direct
communication (QSDC) protocol can be constructed based on the entangle-
ment establishment protocol given in Section 2.2. In a QSDC protocol, a sender
can send secret messages to a receiver without any pre-shared key between them,
and they do not require any transmission of classical information except for the
eavesdropping detection. Here we assume that Alice wants to send a two-bit
message to Bob (see Fig. 4).
(Step1~4) These steps are the same as those mentioned in Section 2.2.
(Step5) To transmit her secret message, Alice applies dense coding on her
photons by performing the unitary operation on each qubit of Q′1 obtained
in Section 2.2 according to her two-bit messages. If the two-bit message is
00, she will perform I = |0〉 〈0|+|1〉 〈1|; if the two-bit message is 01, she will
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perform σz = |0〉 〈0|− |1〉 〈1|; if the two-bit message is 10, she will perform
σx = |0〉 〈1| + |1〉 〈0|; otherwise, she will perform iσy = |0〉 〈1| − |1〉 〈0|.
After the encoding, Alice generates decoy photons as in Step 1 of Section
2.2 by TP1, and inserts them to Q′1 to form a new sequence S
′
1, which is
then transmitted to TP2. Upon receiving S′1, TP2 publicly discusses the
decoy photons with Alice as in Step 2. If there are eavesdroppers detected,
they will abort the protocol and return to Step 1.
(Step6) TP2 removes the decoy photons from S′1, and inserts new decoy pho-
tons into the particle sequence to form S′′1 , which is then transmitted to
Bob.
(Step7) Bob and TP2 again discuss the decoy photons for detecting the eaves-
droppers. If the quantum transmission between TP2 and Bob is secure,
Bob can remove the decoy photons and obtain the particle sequence Q′1.
Bob then performs Bell measurement (EPR measurement) on every pair
of qubits respectively from Q′1 and Q
′
2. According to the measurement
results, Bob can obtain Alice’s secret message. (See Eq. (2))
I |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) = |Φ+〉
σz |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) = |Φ−〉
σx |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) = |Ψ+〉
iσy |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) = |Ψ−〉
(2)
3 Security Analyses
This session analyzes the security of the proposed protocols. First, in Section
3.1, the security of the entanglement establishment protocol is analyzed. The
security of the QSDC protocol is analyzed in Section 3.2. The formal security
proof using the random oracle model is described in the appendix.
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3.1 Security of the Entanglement Establishment Protocol
For an entanglement establishment protocol, the attacker may try to obtain
Alice’s entanglement qubits. Hence, the attacker can share a quantum entan-
glement with Bob. Here, three possible attack strategies will be discussed: the
entangle-and-measure attack, the intercept-and-resend attack, and the entan-
glement swapping attack. The analyses indicate that the external attacker and
the TPs in the protocol cannot successfully obtain the entanglement shared
between Alice and Bob without being detected.
The Entangle-and-measure Attack
When TP1 sends S1 to Alice in Step 1, the external eavesdropper, Eve, may
perform the entangle-and-measure attack [27–29] to steal the transmitted qubits
in S1. Because S1 contains TP1’s decoy photons, to avoid being detected, Eve
will try to obtain the states of the decoy photons. For each qubit, q1, in S1, Eve
prepares an ancillary qubit in an arbitrary known state qe = |E〉, and performs
her attack operation U on q1 and qe. The result of Eve’s operation is as follows:
U |0〉
1
|E〉e = a |0〉1 |e00〉e + b |1〉1 |e01〉e
U |1〉
1
|E〉e = c |0〉1 |e10〉e + d |1〉1 |e11〉e
U |+〉
1
|E〉e = 12


|+〉
1
(a |e00〉e + b |e01〉e + c |e10〉e + d |e11〉e)+
|−〉
1
(a |e00〉e − b |e01〉e + c |e10〉e − d |e11〉e)


U |−〉
1
|E〉e = 12


|+〉
1
(a |e00〉e + b |e01〉e − c |e10〉e − d |e11〉e) +
|−〉
1
(a |e00〉e − b |e01〉e − c |e10〉e + d |e11〉e)

 ,
(3)
where |e00〉, |e01〉, |e10〉, and |e11〉 are four states which Eve can distinguish, and
∣∣a2∣∣+ ∣∣b2∣∣ = ∣∣c2∣∣ + ∣∣d2∣∣ = 1.
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To pass the eavesdropping detection, Eve sets b = c = 0 and (a |e00〉e + b |e01〉e
+c |e10〉e + d |e11〉e) = (a |e00〉e + b |e01〉e − c |e10〉e − d |e11〉e) = −→0 . Eve’s op-
eration thus will not change the state of q1, and Eve can successfully pass the
eavesdropping detection. However, b = c = 0 implies (a |e00〉e − d |e11〉e) = −→0 ,
that is, a |e00〉e = d |e11〉e. In this case, Eve cannot distinguish |e00〉 and |e11〉,
and she cannot obtain the information in q1. If Eve wants to distinguish a |e00〉e
from d |e11〉e, her operation, U , will change the state of q1, which will cause her
attack to be detected by TP1 and Alice.
Generally, if Eve want to pass the eavesdropping check, she cannot get any
information. If Eve tries to reveal the whole information from a qubit, she
will change the state of the qubit, and eventually be detected in the public
discussion.
The Intercept-and-resend Attack
TP2 may perform the intercept-and-resend attack when TP1 sends S1 to Alice.
TP2 intercepts all qubits in S1, and generates a sequence of fake photons, which
are sent to Alice. If TP2 can pass the eavesdropping detection process, TP2 then
could successfully share an entanglement with Bob. However, the decoy photons
inserted in S1 are generated by TP1. Because the positions and the bases of
the decoy photons are unknown to TP2, TP2 is unable to exactly generate the
same decoy photons as TP1 did. Hence, TP2’s fake photons will cause errors in
the public discussion between Alice and TP1 with the probability 1 − (75%)n
[20–22], where n is the number of decoy photons. If n is large enough, the
probability will be close to 1.
The Entanglement Swapping Attack
TP1, who generates the EPR states for Alice and Bob, may also try to perform
the entanglement swapping attack [10] to obtain Alice’s secret message. In Step
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1, instead of generating one EPR pair and distributing these two particles to
Alice and Bob, respectively, TP1 generates two EPR pairs, namely |Φ+〉T1,T2
and |Φ+〉T3,T4. TP then distributes qT1, the first particle of the first EPR state,
to Alice, and qT3, the first particle of the second EPR state, to Bob. Because
all the decoy photons are generated by TP1, TP1 can successfully pass the
eavesdropping check of decoy photons in Step 2. If the entanglement correlation
check in Step 3 can be passed, in Step 5, Alice will send the encoded particle,
qT1 to TP2. TP1 can intercept them, remove the decoy photons according to
Alice and TP2’s public communication, and perform an EPR measurement on
the qubit pair qT1 and qT2. According to the measurement result, TP1 can
obtain Alice’s secret message.
But the fact is , when Alice, TP2, and Bob discuss the entanglement of the
shared EPR states in Step 3, for each discussed position, TP1 can measure the
qubit pair qT2 and qT4. The qubits qT1 and qT3 then will be in one of four EPR
states, {|Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 , |Ψ−〉}, which is also known by TP1. Because these
two particles held respectively by Alice and Bob are still in EPR state, they
cannot detect that TP1 generated two EPRs rather than one. However, the
above situation happens only when TP1 is allowed to generate variable EPR
states. In the proposed protocol, however, TP1 is only allowed to generate |Φ+〉,
if he/she performs the above attack, the EPR state shared by Alice and Bob
in public discussion will be in one of {|Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 , |Ψ−〉}, rather than
in |Φ+〉 as in normal situation. For example, if the shared state is |Ψ−〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉), Alice’s and Bob’s Z-basis measurement will be |0〉 and |1〉 (|1〉
and |0〉,) whereas the legal measurement results are |0〉 and |0〉 (|1〉 and |1〉).
TP1’s attack thus will be detected by TP2. The proposed protocol is thus secure
against TP1’s entanglement swapping attack.
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3.2 Security of QSDC Protocol
The above analyses denote the security of the proposed entanglement establish-
ment scheme. The following analyses focus on the security of the QSDC pro-
tocol. Four special attacks–the Trojan Horse attacks, the correlation-elicitation
(CE) attack, the dense coding attack, and the modification attack–will be re-
spectively analyzed. We also indicate that the QSDC protocol satisfies the
Deng-Long criteria, a security requirement for quantum communication proto-
cols.
The Trojan Horse Attacks
Eve (TP1, TP2) may perform the Trojan Horse attacks to reveal Alice’s message.
When TP1 sends S1 to Alice, she can insert her own particle sequence into S1
by adopting the invisible-photon attack [24] or the delay-photon attack [23]
strategy. When Alice sends out S′1 to TP2 after her encoding, Eve can retrieve
her particles, and then obtains Alice’s secret. However, because Alice has set a
wavelength filter and PNS, Eve’s particles can be detected by these devices. If
illegal particles are detected, Alice and TP1 will drop these transmitted particles
and restart the protocol. Hence, Eve cannot obtain any information about
Alice’s secret.
The Correlation-elicitation Attack
The almost dishonest TP2 may try to steal Alice’s secret by performing the
correlation-elicitation (CE) attack [13–16]. When the second qubit of the EPR
state generated by TP1 (denoted as q2) is transmitted to Bob in Step 1, TP2
intercepts it, and generates an ancillary photon qe = |0〉. TP2 then performs the
first controlled-NOT (CNOT) operation on q2 and qe, where q2 is the control
bit, and qe is the target bit. As a result, the two-particle EPR state and the
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ancillary photon can be described as follows:
CNOT2e
∣∣Φ+〉
12
⊗ |0〉e =
1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉) , (4)
where ⊗ denotes the tensor product operation. TP2 then resends q2 to Bob.
When Alice sends the encoded first qubit, q1, of the EPR state to TP2 in Step 5,
TP2 performs the second CNOT operation on q1 and qe, where q1 is the control
bit, and qe is the target bit. Due to Alice’s encoding operation, the state of
q1 and q2 becomes one of |Φ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ+〉, and |Ψ−〉 (see Eq. (2).) The four
possible states after the second CNOT operation are as follows:
CNOT1eCNOT2e |Φ+〉12 ⊗ |0〉e = 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉)12 ⊗ |0〉e
CNOT1eCNOT2e |Φ−〉12 ⊗ |0〉e = 1√2 (|00〉 − |11〉)12 ⊗ |0〉e
CNOT1eCNOT2e |Ψ+〉12 ⊗ |0〉e = 1√2 (|01〉+ |10〉)12 ⊗ |1〉e
CNOT1eCNOT2e |Ψ−〉12 ⊗ |0〉e = 1√2 (|01〉 − |10〉)12 ⊗ |1〉e
(5)
TP2 is now able to obtain Alice’s partial secret according to the Z-basis
measurement result of qe. According to Eq. (5,) if the measurement result of qe
is |0〉, TP2 knows that the state of q1 and q2 is either |Φ+〉 or |Φ−〉; otherwise,
the state is |Ψ+〉 or |Ψ−〉. TP2 can thus obtain partial information about Alice’s
secret message. However, when TP1 sends the sequence S2, which includes q2
of each EPR pair, to Bob, S2 also contains TP1’s decoy photons, where the
positions and bases of these decoy photons are unknown to TP2. If TP2’s
first CNOT operation is performed on an X-basis decoy photon, for example,
qd = |+〉, the result is as follows:
CNOTde |+〉 ⊗ |0〉 = 1√
2
(|++〉+ |−−〉)de (6)
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It can be seen that if Bob measures the decoy photon in X basis, the mea-
surement result will be |+〉 or |−〉 with an equal probability of 50%. Hence, if
the decoy photon is in X basis, TP2’s attack may disturb the state of decoy
photon. Eventually, it causes TP2 to be detected with a probability of 50%.
However, if the decoy photon is in Z basis, TP2’s first CNOT operation will not
disturb the state. Assume that TP1 selects the basis of each decoy photon with
equal probability in Z basis or X basis. TP2’s attack will be detected with the
following probability: 50%× 50%+ 50%× 0 = 25%. Consequently, if there are
n decoy photons, the detection rate of TP2’s attack is 1− (75%)n. If n is large
enough, the probability will be close to 1.
The Dense Coding Attack
The external attacker, Eve, may try to perform the dense coding attack [30]
to reveal Alice’s secret message. When TP1 transmits S1 to Alice in Step 2,
Eve intercepts it, and prepares a sequence of EPR states |Φ+〉e1,e2, where e1
and e2 respectively denote the first and the second particles of the EPR states
generated by Eve. Eve sends all qe1, the first particle of each EPR state, to
Alice in hope that she successfully passes the eavesdropping detection, and thus
Alice’s encoding operations will be performed on Eve’s qe1. Consequently, when
Alice sends out the encoded qubits to TP2 in Step 5, Eve can retrieve her qe1
and performs EPR measurement on every pair of qe1 and qe2. That is, according
to the measurement results (see Eq. (2),) Eve can reveal Alice’s secret message.
However, S1 contains decoy photons. According to Eq. (1,) it can be seen that
the first particle has two measurement results in both two basis. If the original
decoy photon is |1〉, and Alice measures the fake photon, qe1, in Z basis, then the
measurement result will be |0〉 or |1〉 with equal probability. If the measurement
result is |0〉, Eve’s attack will be detected. For each decoy photon, Alice will
get an illegal measurement result on Eve’s fake photon with the probability of
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50%. Let n be the number of decoy photons, Eve’s attack will be detected with
the probability of 1− (50%)n. If n is large enough, the probability will be close
to 1.
The above analyses denote that the proposed protocol is not only secure
against the general attack, but also secure against some special attacks. If TP1
attacks the protocol, he/she will be detected in the public discussion held by
TP2 in Step 3. Similarly, if TP2 attacks the protocol, he/she will be detected
in Step 2, the public discussion of the decoy photons generated by TP1. Two
almost dishonest TPs, TP1 and TP2, share duty to watch each other and as a
result, two strangers, Alice and Bob can have a secure communication between
each other.
The Modification Attack
Eve (TP1) may perform random unitary operations on the encoded qubits when
these qubits are sent from Alice to Bob via TP2. Hence Alice’s message could
be modified [31, 32]. However, the decoy photons are inserted in the quantum
transmission, and Eve does not know the positions of the decoy photons. Eve’s
random operations will cause she being detected in the public discussion between
Alice and TP2 (or TP2 and Bob.)
Considering the following situations: (1) Eve (TP1) might perform only one
operation in hope that the selected position is the encoded qubit rather than the
decoy photon; (2) TP2 performs the modification attack, where TP2 knows all
the positions of the decoy photons. Alice and Bob can simplify use the message
authenticate code to protect the integrity of the transmitted secret message.
The modification thus can be detected.
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The Deng-Long Criteria
The Deng-Long criteria [27] defines the requirements for a secure quantum com-
munication protocol. The requirements are listed as follows:
1. A QSDC protocol does not require any additional classical information
transmissions except for the eavesdropping check. The receiver can di-
rectly read the secret information after the quantum transmissions.
2. Eve, an eavesdropper, cannot obtain any useful information about the
secret message.
3. The sender and the receiver can detect Eve before they encode the secret
message on the quantum states.
4. The quantum states are transmitted in a block by block way.
The following analyses respectively indicate the proposed QSDC protocol satis-
fies the Deng-Long criteria.
1. In the proposed QSDC protocol, Bob can directly reveal Alice’s secret
message according to his measurement results (see Step 7.) Alice sends
classical information in Step 2, Step 3, and Step 5, and they are all for
detecting the eavesdropping. Alice does not send any classical information
except for the eavesdropping check.
2. As shown in the above security analyses, Eve cannot obtain the secret
information sent by Alice.
3. In the proposed QSDC protocol, if Eve (TP1, or TP2) performs attacks
in the entanglement establishment process, Alice and Bob can detect the
attacks in the public discuss process in Step 2 and Step 3. After confirming
the security of the quantum transmission, Alice will encode her message
in Step 5.
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4. The quantum transmissions in the proposed schemes, i.e., the entangle-
ment establishment and the QSDC, are sending a sequence of particles
including all the first (second) qubits of the EPR states, which is the
“block by block way.”
4 Conclusions
This paper presents a new method in quantum cryptography that allows multi-
ple strangers to establish an entanglement with the help of two almost dishonest
TPs. Each TP is designed to prevent the other TP from acting maliciously;
hence, both TPs can be almost dishonest. The proposed protocol can also be
easily transformed into a quantum communication, a quantum teleportation,
a quantum key distribution, a quantum private comparison, etc., between two
strangers. It is indeed a challenging task to provide a scenario, secure entangle-
ment establishment between two strangers using other approaches. It would be
an interesting future research to have a secure entanglement establishment for
strangers, who cannot find two common TPs to help them.
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Appendix - Formal Security Model and Analysis
In this section, we define the adversarial model of the two public discussions
in Step 2 and Step 3 of the proposed scheme. The security of the first pub-
lic discussion (Step 2) is analyzed in Section A.1 and then, the second public
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discussion (Step 3) is analyzed in Section A.2.
A.1 The First Public Discussion
In the following analyses, the public discussion between Alice and TP1 is ana-
lyzed. Note that the security of the public discussion between Bob and TP1 is
the same as the one between Alice and TP1, hence we omit that in the following
description.
Formal Security Model
The security model of the interactions between an adversary and the pro-
tocol participants occurs only via oracle queries which model the adversary’s
capabilities in a real attack. Let A denote Alice, TP1 denote TP1, and P1
is the public discussion they participate. The participants of P1 can launch
more than one instance. Here we allow a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary A to potentially control all the communication in the network via
accessing to a set of oracles as defined below. Let Ai denotes the instance i of
A. TP1j is the instance j of TP1.
Execute(Ai,TP1j): The query models the passive attack. An adversary can
obtain all messages exchanged between Ai and TP1j.
Reveal(Ai): In this query model, if the oracle has accepted, it returns the
secret quantum state between Ai and TP1j to the adversary; otherwise,
it returns the null value to the adversary.
Send(Ai/TP1j,m): This query models an active attack. It returns the infor-
mation corresponded to an input m that Ai or TP1j would send to each
other.
Corrupt(Ai,a): This query models corruption capability of the adversary. If
a = 0, it returns a null value; otherwise, it returns the secret quantum
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states between Ai and TP1j.
Test(TP1j): This query measures whether the public discussion is secure or
not. By throwing an unbiased coin, b, if b = 1, it returns a random bit
sequence with the same length as Ai’s measurement result. The query can
only be called once.
In this model, we consider two kinds of adversaries. A passive adversary is
allowed to issue the Execute and Test queries and an active adversary is ad-
ditionally allowed for sending the Send query.
Definitions of Security
To demonstrate the security of the first public discussion, we will give the
security definition as follows.
Definition 1 (Partnering): Ai and TP1j are partnered, if they mutually
authenticate each other.
Definition 2 (Freshness): An entity Ai with the partner TP1j is freshness
if the following two conditions hold:
(1) If it has accepted an measurement resultMR 6= null and both the entity
and its partner have not been sent a Reveal query.
(2) There is no Corrupt query has been asked before the query Send has
been asked.
The advantage of the adversary A is measured by the ability of distin-
guish a legal measurement result from a random value. We define Succ to
be an event that A correctly guesses the bit b, which is chosen in the Test
query. Hence, the advantage of A in the attacked scheme P1 is defined as:
AdvP1 (A ) = |2× Pr [Succ]− 1|. We argue that the public discussion P1 is se-
cure, as AdvP1 (A ) is negligible. Precisely, the adversary A does not have any
advantage to obtain the correct measurement result between the participants.
Security Analysis
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In the following description, we show that the public discussion, P1, holds
several security properties, which are required for a secure quantum crypto-
graphic public discussion. Let the maximum advantage of the adversary with
running time Tm be for a certain task denoted as AdvTask (Tm). The following
advantages will be used in the analyses.
AdvCloneQubit (Tm): The advantage for cloning a qubit.
AdvForgeA (Tm): The advantage for impersonate himself/herself as Alice (A).
Lemma1 The advantage for cloning a qubit, AdvCloneQubit (Tm), is negligible.
Proof The quantum no-cloning theory has already been well-proven in several
researches [20], here, we briefly describe the proof.
Assume that for an input qubit qi with an arbitrary state, there exists a
clone operation U . The clone operation can be defined as follows:
U |0〉i |e〉o = |0〉i |0〉o
U |1〉i |e〉o = |1〉i |1〉o
U |+〉i |e〉o = |+〉i |+〉o ,
(7)
where |e〉o denotes the output qubit, and |e〉 is an arbitrary initial state.
Because |+〉i = 1√2 (|0〉+ |1〉)i, it implies that U |+〉i |e〉o =
1√
2
(U |0〉i |e〉o + U |1〉i |e〉o) =
1√
2
(|0〉i |0〉o + |1〉i |1〉o). However, U |+〉i |e〉o = |+〉i |+〉o =
1√
2
(|0〉i |0〉o + |0〉i |1〉o + |1〉i |0〉o + |1〉i |1〉o), which is not equal to 1√2 (|0〉i |0〉o + |1〉i |1〉o).
The contradiction shows that the qubit cannot be cloned. AdvCloneQubit (Tm)
is negligible.
Lemma2 Suppose that there exists an attacker A , who impersonates as Al-
ice (A) with the running time Tm in the public discussion. Then the
advantage of A , AdvForgeA (Tm) =Adv
Clone
Qubit (Tm).
Proof Suppose that A impersonates as Alice. In Step 1 of the proposed
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scheme, TP1 sends a quantum sequence to Alice, and discusses the de-
coy photons with Alice in Step 2. If A can successfully impersonate as
Alice, then she can send her fake photon to Alice, and TP1 cannot detect
the problem.
When TP1 sends the qubit sequence S1 to Alice, A constructs an at-
tack β to clone every qubit in S1. The sequence of the cloning outputs
is denoted as Sˆ1. Then, β sends the original sequence S1 to Alice. Alice
will acknowledge TP1 that she has received the qubits. Then TP1 will
announce the bases and positions of the decoy photons to Alice. Alice will
select the corresponding qubits from S1 and measure them in the bases
TP1 announced. Alice then transmits all the measurement results to TP1
and TP1 can compare the measurement results and his/her initial states
of decoy photons to detect the existence of the eavesdroppers. Because
these public classical informations are transmitted via the authenticated
channel shared between Alice and TP1, β cannot forge or modify them.
Here, β’s goal is to successfully clone the qubits from S1 to Sˆ1. β runs a
subroutine and simulates its attack environment, and gives all the required
public parameters to A . Without losing the generality, assume that A
does not ask queries on the same message more than once. β maintains
a list LCloneQubit to ensure identical responding and avoid collision of the
queries. β simulates the oracle queries of A as follows:
Send-query: The send query is classified into the following types:
• Send(TP1j, S1
)
: β clones every qubits in the quantum sequence S1,
and forms the output qubits as a new sequence Sˆ1. β returns Sˆ1 to
A .
• Send(Ai, ok): Alice sends the acknowledgement to TP1 for receiving
qubits. β direct pass the collected information to A .
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• Send(TP1j, pos&bases): TP1 announces the positions and bases of
the decoy photons to Alice. β direct pass the collected information
to A .
• Send(Ai,mr): Alice sends the measurement results to TP1. β stores
these results for the test query.
Execute-query: When A asks for an Execute(Ai,TP1j) query, β re-
turns the transcript
〈
Sˆ1, Send
(
Ai, ok
)
, Send
(
TP1j, pos&bases
)〉
to
A by using the simulation of send query.
Test-query: When A makes the test query, if the query is not asked in
the first session, then β will abort it; otherwise, β randomly chooses
a bit b. If b = 0, β returns the value of Send
(
Ai,mr
)
; otherwise,
β returns a random string to A . The adversary has to distinguish
the random string from a legal measurement result. In order to do
that, if the quantum could be cloned, A can measure the qubits
from Sˆ1 by using the positions and bases obtained from the query
Send
(
TP1j, pos&bases
)
. Then, the adversary can successfully get
the legal measurement results, hence the random string and the legal
measurement results can be distinguished. Hence, the adversary’s
advantage, AdvForgeAlice (Tm) =Adv
Clone
Qubit (Tm).
A.2 The Second Public Discussion
In the following analyses, the public discussion between Alice, Bob and TP2 is
analyzed.
Formal Security Model
Let A denotes Alice, B denotes Bob, TP2 denotes TP2, and P2 is the
public discussion they participate. To describe the multiple instances of the
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participants, let Ai denote the instance i of A, Bj denote the instance j of Bob,
and TP2k is the instance k of TP2.
Execute(Ai,Bj,TP2k): The query models the passive attack. An adversary
can obtain all messages exchanged between Ai, Bj and TP2k.
Reveal(Ai, Bj): In this query model, if the oracle has accepted, it returns the
secret quantum state between Ai and Bj to the adversary; otherwise, it
returns the null value to the adversary.
Send(Ai/Bj/TP2k,m): This query models an active attack. It returns the
information corresponded to an input m that Ai, Bj , or TP2k would send
to each others.
Corrupt(Ai,Bj,a): This query models corruption capability of the adversary.
If a = 0, it returns a null value; otherwise, it returns the secret quantum
states between Ai and Bsj .
Test(TP2k): This query measures whether the public discussion is secure or
not. By throwing an unbiased coin, b, if b = 1, it returns a random bit
sequence with the same length as Ai and Bj ’s measurement results. The
query can only be called once.
Similar as the previous model, we consider two kinds of adversaries. A pas-
sive adversary is allowed to issue the Execute and Test queries and an active
adversary is additionally allowed for sending the Send query.
Definitions of Security
To demonstrate the security of the first public discussion, we will give the
security definition as follows.
Definition 1 (Partnering): Ai, Bj and TP2k are partnered, if they mutually
authenticate each other.
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Definition 2 (Freshness): The entities Ai and Bj with the partner TP2k
is freshness if the following two conditions hold:
(1) If it has accepted an measurement resultMR 6= null and both the entity
and its partner have not been sent a Reveal query.
(2) There is no Corrupt query has been asked before the query Send has
been asked.
The advantage of the adversary A is also measured by the ability of distin-
guish a legal measurement result from a random value. Hence, the advantage of
A in the attacked scheme P2 is defined as: AdvP2 (A ) = |2× Pr [Succ]− 1|.
We argue that the public discussion P1 is secure, as AdvP2 (A ) is negligible.
Precisely, the adversary A does not have any advantage to obtain the correct
measurement result between the participants.
Security Analysis
In the following description, we show that the public discussion, P2, holds
several security properties, which are required for a secure quantum crypto-
graphic public discussion.
AdvGenFakeState (Tm): The advantage for generating a fake entangled state
without being detected in the second public discussion.
AdvAttackP2 (Tm): The advantage for attacking P2 successfully.
Lemma3 The advantage for generating a fake entangled state |ψ〉 that can be
written as |φ〉 |Φ+〉, AdvGenFakeState (Tm) is negligible.
Proof Let |φ〉 be an special entangled state that an adversary can generate.
The adversary will try share this state with the legal users, Alice and
Bob, before the second public discussion. During the second public dis-
cussion, because Alice, Bob, and TP2 will check if the state shared by Alice
and Bob is |Φ+〉. In this case, the adversary should make |φ〉 = |Φ+〉 |ψ〉,
where |ψ〉 is the state held by the adversary, and |Φ+〉 is shared among
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Alice and Bob.
However, |φ〉 =|Φ+〉 |ψ〉 implies that |φ〉 is a product state (i.e., it is
the product of |ψ〉 and |Φ+〉), which is not entangled. The contradic-
tion shows that the advantage to generate such special quantum state,
AdvGenFakeState (Tm) is negligible.
Lemma4 Suppose that there exists an attacker A , who wants to success-
fully attack P2 with running time Tm in the public discussion. Then
AdvAttackP2 (Tm) =2×AdvCloneQubit (Tm)+AdvGenFakeState (Tm).
Proof Suppose that A wants to attack P2 procedure. The adversary hopes
that he/she could share an entangled state with Alice, Bob, and him-
self/herself. A constructs an attack γ to help him/her. γ will generate
a special quantum state and distribute them to Alice, Bob, and the ad-
versary. To send fake qubits to Alice and Bob without being detected, γ
has to pass the first public discussions between Alice and TP1 (Bob and
TP1.) Then, when the second public discussion is started, the fake qubits
held by Alice and Bob can be converted to |Φ+〉, then the second public
discussion will be success.
Here, γ’s goal is to successfully generate a fake entangled state, and pass
the first public discussions. γ runs a subroutine and simulates its attack
environment, and gives all the required public parameters to A . Without
losing the generality, assume that A does not ask queries on the same
message more than once. γ maintains a list LGenFakeState to ensure iden-
tical responding and avoid collision of the queries. γ simulates the oracle
queries of A as follows:
Send-query: the send query is defined as follows:
• Send(TP1k, S1/S2
)
: when TP1k sends S1 (S2) to A
i (Bj), γ gener-
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ates a sequence of a n-qubit fake state |φ〉
123...n, sends all the first
qubits q1 to Alice and all the second qubit q2 to Bob. The remained
qubits q3...n of all the fake states are denoted as ˆS3...n to A .
• Send(Ai/Bj , ok): Alice and Bob will notify TP2 the first public dis-
cussion has been success. γ direct pass the collected information to
A .
• Send(TP2k, pos&bases): TP2 announces the positions and bases to
Alice and Bob. γ direct pass the collected information to A .
• Send(Ai/Bj ,mr): Alice and Bob sends the measurement results to
TP1. γ stores these results for the test query.
Execute-query: When A asks for an Execute(Ai,BjTP2k) query, γ
returns the transcript
〈
ˆS3...n, Send
(
Ai/Bj, ok
)
, Send
(
TP2k, pos&bases
)〉
to A by using the simulation of send query.
Test-query: When A makes the test query, if the query is not asked in
the first session, then γ will abort it; otherwise, γ randomly chooses
a bit b. If b = 0, γ returns the value of Send
(
Ai/Bj,mr
)
; oth-
erwise, β returns a random string to A . The adversary has to
distinguish the random string from the legal measurement results.
In order to do that, if the special entangled state |φ〉
123...n can be
converted to |φ〉
123...n = |Φ+〉12 |ψ〉3...n, Alice and Bob can gener-
ate a legal pair of measurement results, and A can obtain their
measurement result from |ψ〉
3...n. To success such attack, γ has to
impersonate as Alice and Bob to respectively pass the two public
discussions (i.e., the first public discussion between Alice and TP1
and between Bob and TP1.) Hence, the adversary’s advantage can
be derived as AdvAttackP2 (Tm) =Adv
Forge
Alice (Tm) + Adv
Forge
Bob (Tm) +
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AdvGenFakeState (Tm). According to Lemma2, Adv
Attack
P2 (Tm) =2 ×
AdvCloneQubit (Tm) +Adv
Gen
FakeState (Tm).
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